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Abstract
Following Brown and Sessions (1999) we apply the comparative techniques originated by
Wolpin (1977) and Psacharopoulos (1979) to discriminate between the weak and strong
screening hypotheses. Our data provides additional empirical results for the Italian labour
market shifting the focus of the relationship between education and wages from the highest
level of education completed to more specific measurements like degree score and
completion speed. Our results show that the strong screening hypothesis is strengthened, i. e.
that educational performance has an insignificant return for the self−employed, but a
significantly positive return for employees.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between education and productivity has received enormous atten-
tion since it was formalized in both human capital (Mincer 1958; Shultz 1961; Becker
1964) and sorting models1 (Arrow 1973; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975). According to
the human capital theory education directly increases individual productivity by
augmenting the skills of agents. According to sorting theory education acts as a ﬁl-
ter, separating more able individuals from the less able ones. Both the more highly
skilled and the more able individual achieve greater productivity and receive more
pay than the less skilled and less able one.
Economic theories of education, be they of the human capital or sorting varieties,
are based on the same principle: schooling is pursued to the point where its marginal
private internal rate of return equals the rate of interest. Empirically, both theories
predict the same result: earnings should increase with schooling.
As both human capital models and sorting models of education are based on the
same principle and predict the same empirical result it could be argued that the
debate as to whether education augments skills or signals innate abilities is largely
redundant (Brown and Sessions 1999). Since education enhances individuals’ life-
time earnings regardless of whether it signals productivity or augments it, it is a
sound investment for the individual. Since intelligent individuals produce external-
ities by creating ideas and new ways of doing things, education as a sorting device
is a good investment for society.
As a consequence, a society which allocates intelligent individuals to positions
where they produce large externalities should have larger growth rates than one
which places average individuals in these positions (Murphy et al. 1991). But the
extent to which society can take advantage of this depends on the eﬃciency of the
social sorting mechanism. Thus, much of the vast amount of literature on education
produced in the last 25 years tests whether or not the sorting hypothesis can be
empirically conﬁrmed (Riley 2001). For example, Heywood and Wei (2004) review
the empirical evidence of nearly thirty signalling tests, and conclude that virtually
no generalizations can be drawn2.
It is diﬃcult to assess whether schooling is an institution able to reveal innate
ability or not, because the eﬀects of education which augment skills and those which
select ability are not empirically distinguishable3. This is, however an interesting
1Weiss (1995) uses the term "sorting" to refer to both signalling and screening of workers: Both
signalling and screening serve to sort workers according to their unobserved abilities. They diﬀer
according to who takes the initiative: if the agent - that is, the party who possesses the private
information - uses signals to transmit his/her characteristics to the employer before the contract
is drawn up, this is signalling; if instead it is the employer who seeks to discriminate among
heterogeneous agents by oﬀering a range of alternative contractual conditions, this is screening.
The underlying hypothesis is that abilities that are correlated with schooling positively aﬀect
productivity on all jobs.
2However, they test the signalling hypothesis in the labor market of Hong Kong and subse-
quently ﬁnd that education plays a signalling role.
3One of the main appeals of the screening hypothesis lies in the diﬃculty of testing it empirically
(Psacharopoulos 1996).2
question because whether education has a social beneﬁt associated with an eﬃcient
sorting process depends upon educational performance being related to certain pro-
ductivity enhancing abilities, i. e. if university grades and income in the market-
place measure the same individual qualities. This paper focuses on the screening role
of education and tests the signalling function of grades. Test scores are the essence
of the schooling signal, since employers would use the individual’s educational rank
to infer his position in the distribution of abilities4 thereby improving the overall
match of workers to jobs.
Educational performance is the product of the ﬁnal mark and the speed at which
students complete their academic career. Individuals not only pursue a course (num-
ber of years of schooling), they are also tested and get a grade when they complete
their schooling. Individuals may signal their high productivity by achieving high
test scores and/or successfully passing their exams at a young age5 . Potential em-
ployers know both how much education an individual had before being tested and
his score in the test, and we can assume they base wage oﬀers on this information.
We build on the educational screening theory starting with the assumption that
screening is more important in some sectors than in others, and that individuals
decide to work in the screened or in the unscreened sector prior to the completion
of a degree. Then we assume that individuals pursue their educational performance
with their prospective employment in mind.
As long as pre-university productivity is a large component of post-university
productivity, individuals who need not identify their productivity before employ-
ment have less incentive to acquire high test scores. As a consequence, for any
given innate productivity, the unscreened worker will acquire lower test scores than
the screened worker or, conversely, for any given educational performance, the un-
screened worker will be of greater innate productivity, and thus have greater earnings
than the screened worker.
Following Wolpin (1977) and Riley (1979) we compare the return to education
for self-employed and salaried workers. We assume that the self-employed constitute
the unscreened group since they have no need to signal innate ability to a future
employer6 . Therefore, the returns to education for the self-employed are nothing
but true returns to human capital. If the screening hypothesis holds, then the
signalling value is the diﬀerence between the returns to education for employees and
the self-employed7.
4"If education is a signal, then the essence of the signal should be distilled in the position of an
individual in the distribution of education for his cohort" (Kroch and Sjoblom, 1994 p. 156).
5Layard and Psacharopolous (1974) suggested that, under signalling, individuals who complete
qualiﬁcations slowly send a poor ability signal to employers and therefore face lower wages. Groot
and Oosterbeek (1994) suggested that accelerated qualiﬁcations provide a signal of high ability
and therefore ought to be associated with higher wages.
6Of course, there may be others, for example, customers, who would provide the incentive for
identiﬁcation (Wolpin 1977).
7In Italy self-employment represents a clear alternative to wage and salary employment because
the percentage of self-employed workers over total employed is above 27%. The data of the Statis-
tical Oﬃce of the European Union (EUROSTAT) envisage employers, self-employed workers and
family workers as being in self-employment. The share of self-employment in Italy is three times3
Following Brown and Sessions (1998) we test two versions of the screening hy-
pothesis: The strong screening hypothesis and the weak screening hypothesis8 . The
strong screening hypothesis states that schooling is merely a signal for employers of
the productivity of an employee. The weak screening hypothesis on the other hand
states that the primary role of schooling is to signal, but that schooling also has
some inherent productivity.
The weak screening hypothesis implies a signiﬁcant positive return to education
for self-employed, but a signiﬁcantly higher positive return for employees. The strong
screening hypothesis, in contrast, implies an insigniﬁcant return to education for
self-employed, but a signiﬁcantly positive return for employees (Brown and Sessions
1998).
In this paper we provide additional empirical results for the Italian labour mar-
ket. Our data allows to shift the focus of the relationship between education and
wages from the highest level of education completed to more speciﬁc measurements
like degree score and completion speed. Our results show that the strong screening
hypothesis is strengthened, i. e. that educational performance has an insigniﬁcant
return for the self-employed, but a signiﬁcantly positive return for employees.
2 Data and Methodology
Our data are derived from the last Survey on Labor Market Transitions of University
Graduates carried out in 2001 by the Italian National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT).
The Survey is the result of interviewing Italians who graduated in 1998 three years
after graduation. The retrospective information gathered allows analysis of both
academic performances (ﬁnal degree grades) and ﬁrst entry into the labor market9.
To test the screening hypothesis we restrict the sample to full-time workers. The
Survey considers three work categories: employees, self-employed, and those in ad-
visory positions. However, because in the Italian labor market, the advisors could
be a subset of both employees and self-employed, we decided to rule them out from
our estimating sample. Lastly, because our sample consists entirely of graduates,
we have only considered individuals that needed a degree for the profession they are
developing at the time of the interview10. Therefore we test the screening hypothesis
higher than in Denmark and in Luxembourg, and more than double the share in Germany, Nether-
lands, France, Austria, Finland, United Kingdom and Sweden; only Greece exceeds the Italian rate
(Eurostat 2004).
8Psacharopoulos (1979) distinguishes between strong screening (where education does not add
to individual productivity), and weak screening, (where employers use educational performance
in determining individual starting wages in the absence of any further information about their
productivity).
9The graduate population of 1998 consisted of 129,307 individuals. The ISTAT survey was
based on a 28% sample of these students and was stratiﬁed on the basis of degree course taken
and by the sex of the individual student. The response rate was about 57%, yielding a data-set
containing information on 20,844 graduates. The data contains information on the educational
curriculum, the occupational status, the student’s family background and personal characteristics.
10These individuals are deﬁned as those who responded "yes" to the ISTAT survey question:
"To access your actual job, was the possession of a degree a necessary requisite?"4
only for highly skilled workers. After this initial screening the sample reduces to
6236 individuals.
In order to take into account both the ﬁnal degree mark and the speed11 at which
students complete their academic career, we built up a measure for educational
performance: EDPERF.




where Dscore is the degree mark plus the laude, denoting excellence, when it occurs.
The number of years (Years) used to get the degree is eventually corrected for those
having carried out the military service during university years. Obviously, the degree
scores have been normalized to take into account the diﬀerent marking scale for each
faculty.
We estimate the earnings functions for full-time employees and the self-employed
by controlling for self-selection. We estimate the sample selection model by means
of the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. The sample selection model consists of
two equations. The outcome equation is given by:
wi(ES) = x
′
1iβ1 + ǫ1i (2)
Equation (2) represents the earning function for the employment status ES, where
ES could be self-employed or a salary earner. Such estimation must take into
account the possibility that individuals may select a particular employment status
for themselves because they have a comparative advantage. For this reason the OLS
estimation of equation (2) may yield biased and inconsistent estimates of population
parameters. The sample selection model adds to equation (2) a second equation,
the selection equation, which is of the binary choice type:
yi = x
′
2iβ2 + ǫ2i (3)
The binary variable yi simply indicates working in self-employment (yi = 0) or
working as an employee (yi = 1). A sample selection bias in the OLS estimation of
equation (2) arises if the covariance between ǫ1 and ǫ2, σ12 is not null.
We ﬁrst consistently estimate equation (3) by probit maximum likelihood es-
timation and then we use the estimation results of this ﬁrst stage to consistently
estimate equation (2) by OLS. The earning regression function for each employment
status, conditional to the choice to be in that status, become:
wi(ES) = x
′
1iβ1 + σ12λi + υi (4)









self-employed status. Φ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal random
variable and φ is its density function.
11In the Italian education system, each faculty set only a minimum number of years to get the
degree. A consequence is that there is a high dispersion in the age the students getting the degree.
The speed of completion of the academic career is, therefore, together with the ﬁnal mark, an
important component of overall educational performance.5
3 Results
The results of the ﬁrst-stage probit model are presented in Table I. Table II shows the
estimation of the wage regression for employees and the self-employed. Our speciﬁca-
tion incorporates labour market experience, marital status, educational performance
(EDPERF) and the high school ﬁnal mark. We also include family background vari-
ables such as the level of education, the employment status and occupation of the
father. We add also further information on the educational attainment and work
experience: work carried out during university, minimum degree score needed for
present work, attainment of professional qualiﬁcation. Lastly we control for the
geographic area of residence.
In Table II the signiﬁcance of lambda conﬁrm the selectivity bias for both work-
ers’ categories. Table II shows that only the employee earn a signiﬁcative positive
return from educational performance. We cannot on this basis reject the Strong
Screening Hypothesis. The signiﬁcative eﬀect of the high school mark for both
groups does not contradict the Strong Screening Hypothesis. In fact, given the
characteristics of our sample, the high school mark could not be considered a sig-
nalling variable. It instead represents individual ability and therefore we have to
control for it.
The dependent variable in the wage equations are the net monthly earnings.
Earnings in the publicly available data are provided in brackets rather than as contin-
uous variables. They fall into four intervals (< €800, €800−€1100, €1100−€1500,
>€1500). We converted the earnings categories to a cardinal scale by assigning val-
ues from one to four to each category. Despite being widely used12, OLS estimation
of an equation with interval data as the dependent variable is generally inconsistent
(Steward 1983). To check out our estimation results we estimate a probit model
where the binary variable indicates if an individual is a "high wage" worker13 for
both classes of employment status. The results presented in Table III are consis-
tent with the estimated earning functions: educational performance has a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect only for the employee.
4 Related literature
Almost all empirical studies that test the screening hypothesis reject the strong ver-
sion, i. e. these studies ﬁnd positive returns to education for self-employed workers
(Fredland and Little 1981, Tucker 1985, Alba-Ramirez and San Segundo 1995, Brown
and Sessions 1998 and 1999, van der Sluis and van Praag 2004, García-Mainar and
Montuenga-Gómez 200514. On the contrary, our data show that educational per-
formance has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect only for employees, and we cannot on this
basis reject the strong screening hypothesis.
12See, among others Dale and Krueger (2002).
13Deﬁned as the workers belonging to the top earning interval.
14One exception is Grubb (1993 and 1995) who found that having a college degree increased the
earnings of employees, but not of self-employed workers.6
The data-set we exploit in this paper presents a signiﬁcant advantage over pre-
vious literature. While most of the previous studies have focused on time spent in
school or on the highest level of education completed as the cause of the relationship
between education and wages, our data enables us to shift the focus onto measure-
ments like degree scores and the speed at which students complete their course. If
education is a signal, then the quality of the signal it provides is important, and
the individuals who complete their academic career slowly and/or achieve low test
scores send a poor ability signal to employers and therefore face lower wages.
As an example, Brown and Sessions (1999) use data derived from the 1989 Banca
d’Italia Survey of Household Income and Wealth and ﬁnd evidence for weak but not
strong screening in the Italian labour market. However the Banca d’Italia Survey
does not contain detailed information on actual years of schooling attended by each
worker. Instead, it reports the highest level of education completed, namely: (i) low
education; (ii) intermediate education; (iii) high education; (iv) university educa-
tion. Comparing the relative earnings of employed and self-employed workers, and
controlling for sample selection, Brown and Sessions ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the rates of return to university education across the two subsamples.
Similarly, Alba-Ramirez and San Segundo (1995) provide estimates of the re-
turns to education in Spain. The schooling variables have been represented by
years of education and by degree completed (namely: less than Primary; Primary;
Pre-secondary; Secondary; University). They ﬁnd that the returns to university
education are higher among self-employed workers than for employees.
Finally, García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez (2005) present evidence to sup-
port the view that signalling theory is relevant in determining individual earnings
in Spain. Education has been represented alternatively by years of schooling and
by qualiﬁcation levels (primary, secondary and higher). When using the years of
schooling, it emerges that returns to education are higher for wage earners than for
the self-employed. When using the qualiﬁcation levels, it emerges that secondary
education produces higher returns for the self-employed than for employees, whereas
the opposite applies for higher education.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the screening role of education and tests the signalling function
of degree scores in Italy. "There is a long history of researchers failing to ﬁnd
an economically signiﬁcant relationship between scores on achievement tests and
wages" (Weiss 1995, p. 140), but the data-set we exploit in this paper enables us
to ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant relationship between scores on educational performance
and wages for Italian university graduates working as employees three years after
graduation.
Our empirical results would appear to oﬀer some support for the sorting theory
of education. The most widely used test to discriminate between the sorting theory
and the human capital theory is to compare the returns to educational performance
for the self-employed and employees. If it turns out that the returns to educational7
performance for the self-employed are insigniﬁcant and the returns to educational
performance are signiﬁcantly positive for employees this would give support for the
strong screening hypothesis.
However, the choice of whether or not to be self-employed is clearly endogenous.
Some individuals will have unmeasured traits that make it more likely that they will
excel as entrepreneurs, while others have traits that will make them better suited
to dependent employment. As a consequence, the observed diﬀerences in returns
to education may not accurately reﬂect what would happen if the same group of
workers were simultaneously observed as self-employed or employees.
We use the Heckman (1979) two-step technique of generating the inverse mills
ratio from a ﬁrst-stage probit for inclusion in the corrected earnings equations. Our
results would appear to oﬀer some support for the strong screening hypothesis, with
insigniﬁcant returns to educational performance for the self-employed and positive
signiﬁcant returns for employees.8
Table 1: First stage probit regression ( 0 =self-employment; 1 =employment)




Experience 0.79062 (0.084 )
Experience2 -0.01459 (0.076 )
Experience in Current Work 0.16043 (0 )
Married 0.034301 (0.472)
Work during University 0.02879 (0.515)
Professional qualiﬁcation 0.76477 (0)
Minimum Score -0.71502 (0)
Father’s Degree 0.16536 (0.001)
Father’s Occupation 0.13128 (0.357)
Father’s Employment Status 0.29846 (0)
North 0.38975 (0)
Center 0.16957 (0.005)
Gender (male) -0.13873 (0.002)
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square: 746.1049 (0)
Percent Correctly Predicted: 82.4
McFadden’s pseudo R-square: 0.1415
p-value in parentheses9
Table 2: Monthly earnings equations
Variable Employment Self-employment
Constant 1.292038 (0) 1.957484 (0.052)
Edperf 0.00257 (0.005) 0.001532 (0.577)
HighSchoolMark 0.010001 (0) 0.019495 (0)
Experience 0.020828 (0.022) -0.009015 (0.750)
Experience in Current Work -0.074742 (0 ) -0.005301 (0.882)
Married 0.0571 (0.017) 0.249404 (0.001)
Work during University 0.081543 (0) 0.084831 (0.03)
Father’s Degree -0.108383 (0) -0.033082 (0.688)
Father’s Occupational Status 0.110273 (0.128) -0.079756 (0.726)
Father’s Employment Status 0.023954 (0.342) -0.130489 (0.099)
North 0.127237 (0) 0.442238 (0)
Center 0.139333 (0) 0.303310 (0.002)
Gender (male) 0.394033 (0) 0.160552 (0.037)
Lambda -0.192184 (0.0005) -0.333646 (0.01)
Valid Cases 4462 1021
Adjust R-squared 0.11 0.06
F 40.146 (0) 5.276 (0)
p-value in parentheses
Table 3: Probit regression ( 0 =low earning; 1 =high earning)
Variable Employment Self-employment
Constant -3.39176 (0) 0.41343 (0.73)
Edperf 0.00416 (0.04) -0.00142 (0.67)
HighSchoolMark 0.00901 (0.01) 0.01089 (0.088)
Experience 0.04777 (0.018) -0.03711 (0.271 )
Experience in Current Work -0.03752 (0.118 ) -0.11313 (0.005)
Married 0.07047 (0.192) 0.23386 (0.011)
Work during University 0.17721 (0) 0.12579 (0.154)
Professional qualiﬁcation 0.01923 (0.696) -0.17464 (0.091)
Minimum score requested for current work -0.21711 (0.002) -0.23539 (0.348)
Father’s Degree -0.23284 (0) 0.01761 (0.856)
Father’s Employment Status 0.08204 (0.143) -0.27259 (0.001)
North 0.21812 (0.001) 0.14475 (0.147)
Center 0.18986 (0.013) 0.19951 (0.086)
Gender (male) 0.52685 (0) 0.22807 (0.012)
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square: 195.7380 (0) 45.0997 (0)
Percent Correctly Predicted: 85.4774 69.9314
p-value in parentheses10
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